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The concept “dignity” is neither clear nor unambiguous. The author presents 
two ways in which to typologise this concept as proposed by Daniel P. Sulmasy 
and Adam Rodziński. The problem is that different philosophers attach different 
meanings (types) to the term. The author tries to analyse these meanings, which 
have taken shape in the course of the history of Western philosophy, and also to 
provide a short review on the development of its most common contemporary 
interpretation which equates dignity with the presence of autonomy.
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Introduction
The concept “dignity” shares the sad destiny of many other philosophical 
concepts, since there is no agreement about a clear definition even though we 
encounter many cases of prejudged interpretations of the term. Definitions of 
dignity usually point to its intrinsic value, something which is characteristic for 
a human being as a person. This is where we face difficulties when we lack an 
understanding of what value is and what the human person is. Different philoso-
phers see it differently as do ordinary people in their daily lives.
The article seeks to give an idea of the different approaches to human per-
sonal dignity and thus to give it due respect. This analysis is based on articles by 
American philosophers written for the digest on Human Dignity and Bioethics at 
the request of the President’s Council on Bioethics.
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1. The concept of human dignity in ethics: some classic views
As mentioned above, dignity is defined as a special kind of value, inherent 
particularly in the human personality. The question of whether someone can or 
cannot be considered a person: is a subject of special research: this will be only 
briefly discussed in the second part of the article in which the author shall be 
writing on the origins of the concept of dignity, how these are interpreted by phi-
losophers nowadays and also by those of the Modern Age. First and foremost, we 
shall address different concepts with regard to values and also the ideas behind 
human dignity in more detail.
There are many theories of value which may be reduced to three main at-
titudes. The first argues for an object’s value which exists independently from 
an apprehension of it by one’s consciousness and which is not determined by the 
person, but is absolute and inviolable, this being true at least for the highest of 
moral and personal values. This is what objectivism and realism teach, supported 
mainly by ancient thinkers from Plato to the Thomists and which has not become 
outdated in recent times. This approach remains topical as a result, for example, 
of Max Scheler’s and Dietrich von Hildebrand’s concepts. 
The second approach argues for values being the subjective reaction to certain 
natural features of objects — their physical and chemical regularities (e.g. John 
L. Mackie’s projectivism). The third argues for values being a sort of secondary 
feature. They come to the fore during evaluation, they belong ontologically to 
the relationship between objects and subjects but not to the subjects themselves. 
Thus, the second and third approaches are actually variations of subjectivism.
In speaking of values, one usually means moral values, or, in other words, 
the list of principles regulating human behaviour and our understanding of the 
world as a whole. In these cases, values can be interpreted as certain examples 
to be imitated, ideals to be aimed for. Aesthetic values also point to a model of 
beauty which must be implemented. In a sense, it is more difficult to determine 
the meaning of human dignity. Namely, if an example is impossible to follow, it 
is inopportune to speak of a certain imperfect individual’s value as it is not an 
example to others but merely a specific human feature. Furthermore, what kind 
of feature is it? Are all humans endowed with it?
Let us take a look at some concepts of dignity which have become classic. One 
of them is taken from ancient times. The Stoics connected it to respect and a 
good reputation. Cicero believed dignitas to be less dependent on another’s sub-
jective evaluation and moreso on one’s ability to acknowledge the requirements 
of human perfection. For example, this kind of superiority loathes a life of luxury 
and prefers thrifty, strict and intelligent living. Thus, to the human being living 
in accordance with this requirement is granted an appropriate kind of dignity in 
society as well as a high official standing (Sulmasy, 2008, 470).
In modern philosophy the concept of Thomas Hobbes piques the interest 
of researchers. He equated the concept to the price paid for exploiting human 
effort or, more politely, for human productivity, efficiency and use. This kind of 
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value cannot be absolute by definition for it depends on another human being’s 
assertion. Hobbes wrote, »the publique worth of a man, which is the value set on 
him by the Commonwealth, is that which men commonly call dignity« (Hobbes, 
1991, 64) This means that lifestyle does not matter, as Cicero would agree, but 
rather service to society.
Kant disagreed with Hobbes’ dignity interpretation: he believed that human 
beings are dignity itself. Kant explains his disagreement with Hobbes’ under-
standing in his categorical imperative, firstly in its second version: »Act so that 
you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, 
always at the same time as end and never merely as means« (Kant, 2002, 46–47).
The end–in–itself means an objective value rather than conditional, insofar as 
it is not achieved by our activity which is the case with conditional value. This is 
the reason why it is a prerequisite of the value which is ascribed to it by us wish-
fully. Being an end–in–itself, mankind is connected to an absolute limit which 
restricts all other ends and maxims as well as actions imposed upon us by those 
purposes and maxims. We can say that it is not the object which we turn into 
our objective but rather the highest limiting condition for our other ends (Shell, 
2008, 336).
When Kant writes that personal dignity is stipulated by a person’s human-
ity, in other words by one’s belonging to humankind, he means that neither our 
public status nor even our morals — the things we do — give us dignity but 
rather that which we are. Peter A. Lawler writes: »To connect dignity with the 
actual practice of moral virtue produces inequality or undermines the university 
required for the rational apprehension of moral autonomy« (Lawler, 2008, 243).
Consequently, human dignity is what is inherent in a human being. Immanuel 
Kant emphasizes this specificity in an appropriate way, saying that humanity is an 
end–in–itself, having both relative and inner value. This is what he writes in his 
Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals: »What has a price is such that some-
thing else can also be put in its place as its equivalent; by contrast, that which is 
elevated above all price, and admits of no equivalent, has a dignity« (Kant, 2002, 
52).
The description above means that dignity is not acknowledged empirically 
and neither is it reduced to a phenomenon or certain personality feature. It is 
impossible to research a completely “imperceptible” object, however neither can 
philosophers just put aside something as important as dignity. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that there have been multiple attempts to find a definition of dignity.
2. Modern perception and corresponding current interpretations in 
 ethics and bioethics
As a whole, at least three types of such definitions have been developed. Fr. 
Daniel P. Sulmasy, an American Franciscan researcher, in his non–volumet-
ric but well–grounded study Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory and Selected 
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Examples calls them attributed, inflorescent and intrinsic (Sulmasy, 2008, 470). 
Although Sulmasy points out mainly these three definitions, the characteristics 
given by him may also reflect different “zones” encompassed by dignity which 
have been noticed by particular authors without their noticing other features 
also. According to Sulmasy’s typology, inflorescent dignity was emphasized by 
the Stoics, for whom dignity was a specific award. Speaking of those who flour-
ish as human beings, Sulmasy believes that they live a life which is in accord with 
and expresses human intrinsic dignity. The author also considers such meanings 
of dignity as being “derived” from intrinsic dignity. This is exactly what we mean 
when we say that someone “behaves with dignity” or “has lost his/her dignity”. 
Unlike attributed dignity, inflorescent dignity does not depend on a subjective 
evaluation, but rather on an objective concept of human perfection. 
Attributed dignity is connected by Sulmasy with Thomas Hobbes: it is ad-
judged, attributed to a person by others which makes it not only conditional (as 
it provides a service), but also artificial, man–made. Consequently, we ascribe 
special dignity to those who have been given unique skills, talents or strength. 
On the other hand, intrinsic dignity is what every one of us already has just by 
being human, and is not a result of virtue, public status, skills or strength. Dignity, 
when used to mean this, indicates »a value not conferred or created by human 
choices, individual or collective«, it is »prior to human attribution« (Sulmasy, 
2008, 473). This is the view of Kant.
So, dignity is a special type of value, particularly characteristic for a human 
being. Errors in understanding dignity are partly based on incorrect classifica-
tion. We may say that three types of values correspond to three types of dignity 
and are ascribed to human beings by various philosophers. Attributive values 
completely depend on the purposes, hopes, wishes and interests of those making 
the evaluation. This is the reason why Sulmasy refers to these types of so–called 
instrumental values as serving a purpose. Unlike the attributive, intrinsic values 
are not created but rather acknowledged and discovered by us. Acknowledge-
ment of this kind definitely ascribes intrinsic values to those things which truly 
possess it. However, there is no dependence on the evaluator’s will and realiza-
tion that the evaluation might prove wrong if we deny the value of what it pos-
sesses.
Inflorescent value is characterized by the vitality and flourishing of what has 
been given an intrinsic value. Virtues are examples of such values: they are not 
developed for their own sake, but because they indicate something which is in-
herent in us as humans. In comparison, rose buds blossoming on a bush indicate 
the fact that the bush is, namely, a rosebush, not a blackthorn.
Intrinsic dignity is a kind of intrinsic value inherent in all human beings be-
cause they are a part of humankind. The very fact that we use these words testi-
fies that intrinsic dignity is the basis for inflorescent and attributed dignity. At-
tributed dignity is ascribed to those already possessing the intrinsic because of 
their being human, as for example, we do not compliment for the same musical 
talent pianists and dogs that have simply been trained to press piano keys. In 
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the same way, inflorescent dignity points to the fact that a human being, having 
received intrinsic dignity, has “flourished” exactly as a representative of mankind 
who evidently possesses human characteristics.
It should be noted that a similar classification of dignity was suggested in 
1968 by the Polish philosophical anthropologist, Adam Rodziński. The first type, 
which is the dignity of the personality (godność osobowiściowa) is characterized 
by features and attitudes acquired by us, especially our moral state (Rodziński, 
1968, 43–49). Both everyday experience and knowledge about personality dy-
namics speak of the changeability of this type of dignity. Depending on a par-
ticular person’s behaviour and reputation, his or her dignity can be “exalted” 
or “disparaged” to the extent that it is positively or negatively understood by 
society. It is precisely society that judges a person in regard to this kind of dignity 
(attributed dignity and — to a certain extent — inflorescent dignity according to 
Sulmasy). In developing ethics on the basis of personal dignity, we risk reducing 
it to psychology or the sociology of morality (Biesaga, 2001, 49).
The second type of dignity, which is personal dignity (godność osobista), can 
also be considered subjective or psychological. It is a matter of one’s understand-
ing of dignity, and this may vary. Furthermore, it depends on one’s emotional 
experience, hidden from the gaze of outsiders, and does not necessarily meet 
their appraisal. In basing ethics on such a subjective understanding of dignity in 
order to please everyone around us, we transform it either into a subject of hu-
man caprice or into a dictatorship of the state which has a licence to satisfy these 
caprices, for example, through the legalization of euthanasia.
The third type of dignity to which personalists refer in the building of their 
ethics definition, is called by Rodziński godność osobowa and may be translated 
as the dignity of the person. It is evident in interpersonal relationships in which 
we are each other’s “who” not “what”, expressed in Kant’s terms as end rather 
than means. Both intrinsic dignity according to Sulmasy and the dignity of the 
person according to Rodziński are connected with our existence as human beings 
which we neither ascribe to ourselves nor allow society to award or take away 
from us. The dignity of the person is a particularly reliable foundation for a hu-
man rights structure as well as for equity principles, principles of justice and of 
ethics in general.
As emphasized above, ethicists’ conclusions depend to a large extent on the 
definition of dignity that they rely upon as the criterion for their teachings. Most 
errors consist in the lack of ability — or the desire — to see the dignity of the 
person behind the dignity of the personality and personal dignity, and to see 
one’s intrinsic dignity behind attributed and inflorescent dignity. It is the author’s 
opinion that this shortsightedness is connected with the positivist methodology 
dominant among researchers and the ability just to grasp processes and events, 
i.e. changes, while unchangeable permanent features remain, at best, in the back-
ground of the research. Furthermore, intrinsic dignity seems to slip away when 
an attempt is made to define it. Therefore, it does not exist as far as science is 
concerned.
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On the other hand, empirical methods focus on the features which humans 
exhibit in the course of their entire lives. Concepts built on the basis of such fea-
tures can serve the interests of the majority in society, of the state or of corpora-
tions (such as birth regulation, stimulating consumer behaviour, etc.). Therefore, 
theories which consider dignity to be dependent on the characteristics of a par-
ticular person are very popular. 
3. How dignity was understood in the Modern Age
The dignity of a person is closely related to another matter. What do we mean 
when we speak of the value inherent in a person as such? As was already stressed, 
the intrinsic dignity which each of us possesses simply because we are human, 
demonstrates that dignity is innate and absolute. Attributed and inflorescent 
types of dignity are different. Putting aside the original understanding of the 
person and focusing on rationality or autonomy (this appears to be a question 
of inflorescent dignity), which is typical for today’s thinking, seems to aim to 
eliminate the understanding of intrinsic dignity not only as the most important 
type of dignity but also to eliminate it even as being true at all in regard to the 
human being. 
A generalized understanding of dignity means that it is based on a person’s 
rational nature. It provides us with such features as conceptual thinking, rea-
sonableness and deliberation. Thanks to the faculty of conceptual thinking, a 
person creates and learns languages, creates works of art, tools and expresses 
religious sentiment (Lee and George, 2008, 423). However, the main issue is that 
conceptual thinking includes the intuition of essences, which was called the act 
of ideation by Max Scheler (Scheler, 2009, 35).
To be more exact, a predominating belief since the time of Descartes pro-
motes the idea that dignity, since it is a special value, is possessed less by humans 
and moreso by rational agents. The rational agent’s status is, claims Descartes, 
the “rank” according to which one lives, a special kind of nobleness or générosité. 
It is not only a matter of ratio — although throughout history there have been 
many ways to define the human being by means of the mind — but also a matter 
of activity, that is, an active use of intellectual faculties as well as self–possession, 
self–control.
According to Charles Tylor, Descartes introduces the notion of dignity to the 
internal dimension: we act in order to strengthen the sense of our value in our 
own eyes (Tylor, 2001, 152). Thus, such features as strength and self–control, 
which are connected with an interpretation of dignity of this kind, are transferred 
to the internal dimension. Human greatness has been understood since ancient 
times as the dominion of the mind over the passions (e.g. Plato). Descartes seems 
to enhance this idea with a volitional component: true nobleness is the emotion 
accompanied by the sense of one’s own dignity which makes humans evaluate 
themselves appropriately. It partly consists in the knowledge that only the self is 
entitled to command one’s will (Taylor, 2001, 154). This is what brings Descartes’ 
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idea close to Kant’s. The rational human beings’ unique feature has to do with 
acting according to natural laws unlike other beings and submitting to the regula-
tions which they themselves have created. The source of our dignity is the ability 
to act in accordance with the demands of our minds, i.e. our autonomy inherent 
in the moral agent. 
Thus, on the one hand, human dignity flows from out of human self–con-
sciousness which singles out the natural and social environment. However, on the 
other hand, dignity is based on human beings’ knowledge of nature and society, 
i.e. primarily on their ability to change the environment and themselves.
There is a danger, in stressing the active aspect of dignity and sense of self–
worth, of excluding those already, or yet unable, to experience an active au-
tonomy from those having dignity. Many contemporaries believe that the act of 
autonomy is that which detects dignity. This is why, for instance, they take issue 
with paternalism in medical care, since the principles of paternalism allow deny-
ing a patient equity with respect to doctors as rational agents. However, at the 
same time they do not notice their own defiance against those who are not able 
to give expression to their ambition to make others respect their dignity. Such 
people seem to have no dignity.
Consequently, the approach which can be called individualist and which is 
characteristic of the contemporary European allows for the fact that individuals 
(or persons), despite their weaknesses, dependencies and mortality, are still able 
to overcome all unfavourable conditions under which they must exist. A human 
being must overcome them due to his self–consciousness which »sets him apart 
from his natural, political, and familial environment« (Lawler 2008, 234). Blaise 
Pascale called such a creature “a thinking reed” whose dignity is proved in action 
in accordance with its self–consciousness. 
However, self–consciousness is not the only factor which makes a human an 
original being: namely, there is also freedom. These attributes together give a 
person the ability to change one’s nature in order to acquire characteristics which 
have not been originally granted to one. In associating the person or “the self” 
with reflection, modern philosophy, represented by Descartes, has liberated us 
from corporeal restrictions and later even from moral limits which are imposed 
upon us as a result of our belonging to society, that is, ties which were established 
by our common human nature. Consequently, modern technology enables man-
kind to doubt in the existence of a common human nature and to aim at over-
coming humanity itself, that is, to aim for transhumanism.
The author cannot agree with Lawler who emphasizes that precisely »the ra-
tional control that would secure our dignity really does point in the direction of 
transhumanism« (Lawler, 2008, 236). In aiming to surpass our natural limits, by 
being provided some knowledge due to a certain progress in our thinking, we 
have learned to put under control processes which once seemed to be natural 
and beyond our control. Now some of us are trying to achieve more. Our dignity 
consists in realizing the fact that we are pathetic until the moment we take our 
own nature under conscious control.
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Overcoming one’s humanity is just one of the dangers hidden in the modern 
understanding of a person’s dignity. Another danger is the result of stressing au-
tonomy, that is, self–sufficiency, the ability or even the right to act on principles 
established by ourselves. An ability of this kind allows for the development of 
higher mental functions, conceptual thinking etc., which closely correspond to in-
florescent dignity. However, such an understanding of dignity and of its connec-
tion with autonomy originates in the “intrinsic” definition by Kant. Respecting 
“humanity” means not acting upon another person without his or her consent, 
according to the great German philosopher. Thus, the Kantian dignity defini-
tion fully corresponds with liberal values. »Humanity — wrote Susan M. Shell 
on this topic — is the capacity that both enables us to think in terms of value at 
all and orients us toward (without physically necessitating it) full–fledged moral 
autonomy« (Shell, 2008, 337).
Human beings imagine their own existence as an end and themselves as refer-
ence centers. Human existence, the existence of a person has its objective value, 
but only unless humans acknowledge the law as being equally valid for all. Shell 
comes to the conclusion that the objective value of a personality for Kant means 
that we cannot consider ourselves rational unless we allow for a similar value in 
other human beings, who are also organized in the same way as we (Shell, 2008, 
339).
If dignity originates in our ability to act in obedience to our own mind, i.e. 
autonomously, this is precisely the issue in the case that dignity has been granted 
to a limited circle of agents who are the only rationally thinking adults. Kant can-
not guarantee the status of a human being, particularly that of a person, to an 
embryo. 
4. Dignity as a basis for equality in regard to the issues of modern 
 medicine
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, »all human beings 
are born free and equal in their dignity and rights« (UDHR, v). In fact, however, 
we can see that this principle is sometimes interpreted tendentiously and vaguely. 
First of all, this is the case when an individual’s dignity is made contingent upon 
a certain set of proper characteristics. It is autonomy, the basic principle of the 
modern, especially American, mentality that seems to constitute the bare mini-
mum. Ultimately, the reason for dignity is the subject’s ability to act on the basis 
of an autonomous decision (Shell, 2008, 339). As a result of such considerations, 
it is easy to deny the equality of human beings based on their absolute dignity.
Contrary to most present–day theories, the personalist approach treats dig-
nity ontically, that is, associates it with the very fact of human existence, rather 
than with the person’s ability to manifest certain inherent features. Personalism 
tries to “dig deeper,” below the level of psychological and physiological data; it 
appeals to metaphysics, and is therefore not recognized by those who reject the 
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effectiveness of this ancient branch of philosophy. It relies on the obvious fact 
of belonging to mankind, whereby “obvious” is used here in its usual meaning 
but also in the empirical sense, since anyone born of a woman is a human being. 
Similarly, in terms of metaphysics, all expressions of our personality, that is, indi-
vidual acts of reflection or decision–making are merely accidents. The presence 
of such acts, as well as their absence has no effect on dignity because the latter 
refers to the substantive core of the person. As Sulmasy emphasizes, it is not the 
expression of rationality that makes us human beings, but our belonging to a spe-
cies capable of rationality. This is why sometimes we call sick or disabled a person 
who does not demonstrate such attributes (Sulmasy, 2008, 477).
Equality in dignity for all people implies that it cannot be waived or dimin-
ished under any circumstances, even when a person is unable to demonstrate 
the capabilities inherent in his or her rational nature. Similarly, dignity does not 
depend on the age of the person, nor on the duration of a person’s future life. 
In the case of the terminally ill patient, the act of respect for his or her dignity is 
demonstrated in discovering and pursuing the good of the ill person, primarily 
in taking care of the person’s physical needs, mental health and spiritual needs 
until the last moment of his or her life. Human life has a special status which 
derives from the fact that it is the foundation of a person’s dignity, and therefore 
the destruction of life, though “wrongful”, would not represent an act of respect 
by any standards.
Referring to the three definitions proposed by Sulmasy, we can say that ill-
ness impedes development of inflorescent dignity, but never eliminates intrinsic 
dignity. The ill person’s intrinsic dignity remains a certain inviolable point of 
orientation. If we take a closer look at the theses of supporters and opponents of 
euthanasia, we will see that they apply different definitions of dignity. The for-
mer defend attributive dignity (one who is not valued has lost his or her dignity), 
while some of their opponents argue that courage in the face of illness and death 
is beneficial to (inflorescent) dignity. Others still, say that one should respect 
(intrinsic) dignity by considering human life to be sacred regardless, even when 
an individual’s further life seems to be undignified.
Conclusion
This short analysis of a modern understanding of a person’s dignity allows 
us to conclude that it means nothing more that respecting another’s autonomy. 
This definition appears loftier than any of the others. Dignity can be based on 
utilitarian principles, for instance. In this case, dignity depends on the calculation 
of pleasure and suffering in a particular person’s life, and allows us to draw the 
conclusion that pain is contemptible, or to consider someone to be unworthy of 
the status of a person if in his or her existence there is seemingly more suffering 
than pleasure. 
If we use the attributed dignity definition and evaluate people in accordance 
with their labour market value, both the unemployed and those unable to ben-
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efit from selling their labour force due to age or illness will be devoid of dignity. 
On the other hand, we can refer to dignity as being the active use of liberty or 
the ability to make a rational choice. However, in this case, we also must deal 
with those who are temporarily or permanently unable to do so. Thus there is a 
subjectivist scenario after all: we define dignity by our free choice as to what our 
dignity consists in. However, if this is true, then it follows that we cannot fathom 
the dignity of the other person, and this consequently renders useless all theories 
stemming from objective value theories, including Kantianism. 
Thus, in his quest to answer the question as to what dignity is, Sulmasy comes 
to the conclusion that »the argument from consistency claims that fundamental 
human dignity must be something each of us has simply because we are human« 
(Sulmasy, 2008, 495). 
Finally, what does it mean to respect another’s dignity? Firstly, we must re-
member that possessing this value substantiates our existence in the area of mo-
rality which means fulfilling duties as well as claiming the right to expect that 
similar duties will be fulfilled in regard to ourselves. We can say that being a 
person provides us with a game which consists of certain strict and permanent 
rules which, if broken, destroy the game itself and insult all the players. The 
best example of such a rule can be the above–quoted second version of Kant’s 
categorical imperative regarding means and ends. We must demonstrate respect 
to all humans so as not to spoil the game. Moreover, we must not consider the 
quality of the way in which they express their personalities to be an indication of 
the measure of their dignity. Dignity is determined only by one’s belonging to the 
human race.
Thus, we must respect our neighbours, not only because they have autonomy 
and interests which they aim to satisfy, but we must, moreover, provide them 
with our assistance in satisfying their interests because we respect their interests. 
We can say the same about health: since health is the good of the human being 
(respect for a person’s dignity) we must support it rather than ponder the issue of 
dignity and personality while analysing the status of someone’s health. 
Dignity is also based on our readiness to take on duties in regard to another 
personality. We usually call this readiness mercy or love. Fr. Józef Kożuchowski 
defines it in the language of philosophy as the human ability for self–relativi-
zation, that is, “looking at ourselves and the world from the point of view of 
extending our centricity (our good)” (Kożuchowski, 2012/3, 214). True respect 
for a person’s dignity lies in recognising it even in suffering or inferiority and in 
doing this by supporting the life itself of this person, for neither personality nor 
dignity are possible without life. This must be done continually until the moment 
of death. 
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Primjena “dostojanstva” u svjetlu raznih tipologija pojma
Kateryna Rassudina*
Sažetak
Termin “dostojanstvo” nije jasan ni nedvosmislen. Autorica prikazuje dvije varijan-
te tipologije toga termina prema prijedlozima Daniela P. Sulmasyja i Adama Rod-
zińskoga. Problem je u tom što različiti filozofi pridaju različita značenja (tipologi-
je) tomu terminu. Autorica nastoji analizirati definicije koje su oblikovane tijekom 
povijesti zapadne filozofije, te pružati kratki pregled o razvoju njezine najučestalije 
moderne interpretacije, koja izjednačava dostojanstvo s postojanjem autonomije.
Ključne riječi: dostojanstvo; vrijednost; osoba; racionalnost; autonomija; 
poštovanje
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